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Abstract 
This study develops and estimates a standard New-Keynesian DSGE model for 
the Ghanaian economy, for the analysis of the impacts of government spending, 
consumption tax, and labor income tax shocks on household consumption and working 
hours. It also applies the model to examination of the effects of fiscal policy shocks on 
key macroeconomic variables in the Ghanaian economy. The model features 
heterogeneous households of two types, financially excluded and financially included, 
and considers two labor markets: perfectly and monopolistically competitive labor 
markets. We use quarterly time series data from 1985Q1-2017Q4 to estimate the model’s 
parameters using a Bayesian approach. The results show that a positive government 
spending shock has an expansionary effect on the consumption of financially excluded 
households but has a decreased effect on that of fully financially included ones. We find 
that positive consumption and labor income tax shocks decrease the consumption of 
financially excluded households more than that of financially included ones. From a 
policy perspective, government spending is effective for increasing output, employment, 
and the consumption of financially excluded households, although it reduces that of 
financially included ones. 
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1. Introduction 
Fiscal policy, as a macroeconomic policy, is one of the main policy tools available 
to fiscal and public authorities to intervene in and influence the level and the direction of 
real economic activities in an economy. Fiscal policy largely consists of alteration of 
government spending and taxes, and so in fact it is countercyclical demand management 
or macroeconomic policy. That is, during economic downturns (recession), an increase 
in government spending and/or a tax cut are used to boost aggregate demand and thus 
induce economic growth, whereas during economic upturns (boom), where the economy 
overheats, a decrease in government spending and/or a hike in taxes are adhered to in 
order to stabilize the economy. Fiscal policy long been discussed in the economics 
literature as a stabilization tool. For instance, in the 1920s and 1930s, fiscal policy was at 
the center stage in tax discussion by Ramsey (1927) and the macroeconomic analysis of 
Keynes (1936).  
The 2007-2009 financial crisis has brought about a renewal of emphasis on fiscal 
policy as a stabilization policy instrument. The aftermath of the crisis, i.e. recession, has 
forced many governments, in both developed and developing countries, to utilize fiscal 
policy as a stabilization policy tool to stimulate macroeconomic economic variables. One 
argument in favor of the use of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool has been the limited 
financial market participation in many economies. As argued by Furlanetto (2011), if a 
section of the population cannot participate in the financial market, and therefore, 
consumption cannot be smoothed, fiscal policy becomes relevant. In that environment, a 
fiscal stimulus (e.g. increased government spending) can induce an expansionary effect 
in an economy by increasing the current income of households who are excluded from 
the financial market. According to that argument, financially included (“optimizing”) 
households who anticipate an increase in taxes, intended to finance the increase in 
government spending, reduce their consumption and tend to work more to smooth 
consumption; this may result in a reduction in aggregate demand.  However, households 
who cannot smooth consumption (“hand-to-mouth” or financially excluded households) 
simply consume their income to increase aggregate demand without changing their 
employment decisions. Such a behavior by the “hand-to-mouth” households may help to 
prompt an expansionary effect of government spending on key macroeconomic variables, 
especially on consumption and output. In favor of this argument, Spilimbergo et al. (2008), 
IMF staff, as cited in Furlanetto (2011), recommend increased public spending, and 
reduced taxes, or transfers towards households who cannot smooth consumption as a 
fiscal package for many countries. 
In light of the above, many researchers have attempted to analyze, both 
theoretically and empirically, the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in various 
economies. Most such studies applied variants of macroeconomic models such as Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR), Structural VAR (SVAR) and Markov Switching. However, 
because of the limited capacity of those macroeconomic models to account for the 
presence of households who cannot participate in the financial market, consideration has 
been given to the use of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. The 
standard New Keynesian DSGE model, which only incorporates infinitely lived 
representative agents, who are assumed to enjoy full financial inclusion and, therefore, 
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optimize their choices inter-temporally to smooth consumption, has been augmented to 
include those households who are financially constrained3. Despite this development, 
theoretical and empirical accounts DSGE models on the expansionary effects of fiscal 
policy on key macroeconomic variables, especially on consumption and output, is still 
widely debated. In particular, findings regarding the effects of government spending on 
aggregate consumption have been mixed and hence inconclusive.  
Following suggestion by Mankiw (2000), Gali, et al. (2004) were the first to 
introduce “hand-to-mouth” households into their DSGE model. In a related study, Gali, 
et al. (2007) analyze the effect of government spending on consumption using a similar 
model with lump-sum taxes. They find that an increase in government spending has an 
expansionary effect on real economic variables including aggregate consumption and 
output. Following these seminal studies many studies have included various market 
frictions and nominal rigidities to critically examine the effects of various fiscal policies. 
While some of those studies find contradictory evidence to that of Gali, et al. (2007), 
others find supportive evidence. The strand of  the literature finds a positive response of 
consumption following a positive government spending shock (Conenen and Straub 
(2005), López-Salido and Rabanal (2006), Jakab and Világi (2008), Furlanetto and 
Seneca (2009), Iwata (2009), Colciago (2011), Furlanetto (2011) Céspedes et al. (2013), 
González et al. (2014), and Babecký et al. (2018)). On the other hand , some find a 
negative consumption multiplier of government spending shock (Jakab and Világi (2008), 
Ratto et al. (2009), Forni et al. (2009), Stähler and Thomas (2012), Malik (2013), 
Bhattarai and Trzeciakiewicz (2017)).  
The differences among those findings have been attributed to the presence (or 
absence) of various market frictions and rigidities that are featured in DSGE models, 
including size of financially excluded households, price and wage stickiness, and habit 
persistency. For instance, whereas Conenen and Straub (2005) document that a large 
share of financially excluded households (above 35%) is required to generate a positive 
consumption and output multipliers of government spending shock for the Euro Area,  
Iwata (2009) finds a positive consumption multiplier with a relatively small share of such 
households (25%) in the Japanese economy. Also, Ratto et al. (2009) introduce sticky 
wage into their model and find that government spending shock crowds-out consumption. 
However, Furlanetto (2011) and Colciago (2011) finds that the crowding-in effect of 
consumption observed in Gali et al. (2007) is preserved even when wages are sticky.  
Furthermore, as noted by Iwata (2009), the dynamic responses of macroeconomic 
variables to a government spending shock in DSGE models largely depend on the 
financing behavior of fiscal authorities. Thus, a set of realistic tax rules that are practiced 
and used by fiscal authorities in the real world is of utmost importance. For example, the 
importance of including distortionary taxes in DSGE model analysis of fiscal policy 
effectiveness has been ossified by Bilbiie and Straub (2004). They show that distortionary 
taxes decrease after-tax wages and make it more difficult to generate a positive 
consumption multiplier of government spending shock. However, Linnemann (2004) 
shows that government spending shock can crowd-in consumption even when 
                                                            
3 In the literature, they are referred to as “non-Ricardian”, “hand-to-mouth, or “rule-of-thumb” 
consumers. In this paper, we call them “financially excluded” households. 
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distortionary taxes are present, explaining that this is possible when labor supply is elastic 
given that the tax base is widened by unemployment benefits (Iwata, 2009)4. These 
insights suggest that fiscal policy analysis ought to be carried out in models that feature 
distortionary taxes, which are major fiscal instruments on the revenue side of government 
budget5 in lieu of the lump-sum taxes that are considered in most of the models mentioned 
above. 
A number of studies have used DSGE framework to model the Ghanaian economy 
(e.g. Ahortor & Olopoenia, 2010; Houssa et al., 2010; Dagher et al., 2012; Bondzie et al., 
2013; and Bondzie et al., 2014). Among these studies very few, if ever existed, analyze 
the macroeconomic impact of fiscal policy shocks in Ghana. Moreover, most of those 
studies consider only a representative household with full access to the financial and the 
capital markets6. However, a common characteristic of a developing country like Ghana 
is the predominance of financially excluded households; therefore, any macroeconomic 
policy modelling for this economy ought to consider the excluded group of households7. 
Further, most of those studies use calibration rather than estimation to undertake their 
goals. 
This study addresses the above shortcomings, and thus contributes to the debate 
on effectiveness of fiscal policy by developing and estimating a closed economy DSGE 
model, which is rich in frictions and nominal rigidities and considers distortionary 
taxation, for the Ghanaian economy8. In particular, the model considers heterogeneous 
households: financially included and financially excluded households. As well, it 
introduces price stickiness, flexible and sticky wage dynamics, and two distortionary 
taxes: consumption and labor income taxes. We estimate this model using Bayesian 
techniques to examine the macroeconomic impacts of fiscal policy shocks in the 
Ghanaian economy. Specifically, we: [1] analyze the impacts of government spending 
shock on key macroeconomic variables; [2] examine the effects of consumption tax and 
labor income tax shocks on the consumption and employment decisions of both 
financially excluded and included households by considering those shocks as income 
shocks9; and [3] explore the interaction between fiscal and monetary policies in the 
economy.  
As reported in detail later, we find that, among the three fiscal policy instruments 
considered in the model, the response of income tax rate to debt-to-output ratio is the 
                                                            
4 Some of the papers that consider distortionary taxation in their DSGE models with financial exclusion 
include Forni et al. (2009), Iwata (2009), Dagher et al. (2012), Stähler and Thomas (2012), Drautzburg and 
Uhlig (2015), González et al. (2014), and  Babecký et al. (2018). 
5 Indeed, many developing countries, including Ghana, use distortionary taxation rather than lump-sum 
taxation. For instance, prior to use of Value-Added Tax (VAT) system in Ghana, there was a sales tax 
which was replaced by the government in 1995 as a policy change to remedy the deficiencies in the sales 
tax to generate much revenue for the government. 
6 The only exception is the paper by Dagher et al. (2012). 
7 See Takyi and Leon-Gonzalez (2019). 
8 One paper that our paper shares many features with is the paper by Dagher et al. (2012). Even in their 
paper, they use calibration rather than estimation to undertake their goals. This put our paper first as we 
estimate our model in lieu of calibration. 
9 For justification of why analyzing the effect of income shocks on financially included and excluded 
households is desirable, see our previous paper: Takyi and Leon-Gonzalez (2019). 
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largest, followed by government spending and consumption tax rate. This suggests that 
fiscal authorities in Ghana use income tax as one of their major tools for the generation 
revenue to finance government debts and expenditures.  
  We also find that a positive government spending shock has an expansionary 
effect on consumption, output, employment, and inflation but turns to crowd-out 
consumption when wages are sticky. Also, the response of output and inflation to an 
expansionary fiscal policy is somewhat stronger in a market where wages are flexible 
than one where wages are sticky. At the disaggregated level, we find that an increase in 
government spending has a negative effect on the consumption of households who enjoy 
full financial inclusion but has an expansionary effect on that of financially excluded ones. 
Financially included households decrease their consumption in reaction to an upward 
adjustment in the nominal interest rate by the monetary authorities as a way of moderating 
the inflationary pressures caused by the positive government spending shock. 
Furthermore, we find that hikes in consumption and labor income taxes 
discourage working and, thus, lead to a fall in labor supply, output, and consumption. At 
the disaggregated level, our results signal that lack of access to the financial sector and 
savings leave financially excluded households with no alternative to increasing their labor 
supply in order to mitigate the negative effect of those shocks on their consumption. 
Nevertheless, households that are financially included use the financial sector as a 
mechanism for tapping into their savings to insulate themselves from shocks, and rather 
reduce their working hours. Sadly, despite these inter-temporal optimal decisions by both 
households, we find that both type of shock decrease the consumption of the former more 
than that of the latter.  
In addition, a contractionary monetary policy significantly leads to a fall in 
inflation, and in other real variables including output, employment, and consumption. The 
impulse response analysis shows that the response of these variables to a positive 
monetary positive shock is stronger under flexible wage dynamics than under sticky wage 
dynamics.  
Finally, the results of our variance decomposition analysis show that, from the 
non-policy shocks side, technology and price mark-up shocks are important in driving the 
key macroeconomic variables of the Ghanaian economy. From the policy shocks side, 
consumption tax shock emerges as the main driver of those variables in the economy, 
with monetary policy shock playing a smaller role. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. 
Section 3 explains the Bayesian estimation procedure and the data used. Section 4 
discusses the results, and Section 5 presents conclusions and implications. 
 
2. The Model 
The model adopted here closely follows a standard New-Keynesian DSGE model 
featuring the so-called ‘hand-to-mouth’ households developed by Furlanetto and Seneca 
(2012). We, however, deviate from lump-sum tax considered in their model and introduce 
distortionary taxes including consumption and labor income taxes. Also, we introduce a 
fiscal authority (government) who collect those taxes from the households and issues debt 
to finance its expenditures. As a result, we introduce three fiscal rules: consumption tax 
rule, labor income tax rule, and government spending rule. In addition, we depart from 
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labor union who negotiates wages in the labor market on behalf of the households and 
introduce a perfectly competitive and a monopolistically competitive labor markets10.  
 
 2.1 Households 
There are two kinds of households: a fraction λ  of the households are financially 
excluded. These households do not have access to the financial market (and are indexed 
by ‘ m ’, for following ‘hand-to-mouth’ behavior). They neither save nor borrow and 
therefore, simply spend their disposable income in each period. The remaining fraction 
(1 )λ−  of the households are financially included: that is, they have full access to the 
financial market (indexed by o , for ‘optimizing’). This group of households chooses 
plans for consumption, saving, investment, and bond holdings to maximize their lifetime 
utility. Each household maximizes a lifetime identical inter-temporal utility function 
given by: 
0
k
t k t
k
E Uβ∞ +
=
  
where (0,1)β ∈ is the subjective discount factor, and the identical instantaneous utility 
function is given by: 
1
1
1log( ) ( )
1
i i i i
t t t tU C hC N
φ
φ
+
−
 
= − − + 
 
where ( , )i o m∈ denotes the type of households. Here, itC  represents the household’s real 
consumption at time t , 1
i
tC −  is aggregates consumption, 
i
tN  is the hours worked at time 
t , and 0φ > denotes the inverse of the Frisch labor elasticity. The level of consumption 
habit is represented by the parameterh and it is external to the households. 
 
2.1.1. Financially included household utility maximization 
Financially included households maximize the following utility: 
1
1
1log( ) ( )
1
o o o o
t t t tU C hC N
φ
φ
+
−
 
= − − + 
 
subject to a budget constraint: 
1(1 ) (1 )
o o k o o o
c o o nt t t t t t t
t t t t
t t t t t t
B WN R K B DC I
RP P P P P
ι ι −+ + + = − + + +  
as well as capital accumulation, expressed as:  
( )1 (1 ) 1
o
o o ot
t t to
t
IK K K
K
δ+
 
= − + Φ   
Here, tP  denotes the price level, 
o
tI is real investment, 
o
tB  is holdings of one-period 
                                                            
10 The perfectly competitive labor wage setting is as in Gali et al. (2007), whereas the monopolistically 
competitive wage setting is as in Junior (2016). 
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bonds that yield a gross risk-free interest rate tR , tW  is nominal wage, 
o
tK  is capital 
holdings, ktR is the nominal rental rate on the stock of capital rented by the households, 
o
tD  is the dividend stream from firms, ctτ and ntτ are consumption and labor income taxes, 
respectively, paid by the households. Also, δ is the depreciation rate and (.)Φ is capital 
adjustment cost function, which has the following properties: ( )δ δΦ = , ' 0Φ > , 
'( ) 1δΦ = , and " 0Φ ≤ . 
The first order conditions for the financially included household’s problem can 
be written as: 
1
1 (2)
(1 )( )
o
t c o o
t t tC hC
λ
τ
−
=
+ −
( )1 1, 1 1 1 1
1 1
(1 ) ' 3
k o
t t
t t t t t t to
t t
R IQ E Q
P K
δ φ φ+ ++ + + +
+ +
     
= Λ + − + −           
( )1 4
'( )t o ot t
Q
I K
=
Φ
1 1
, 1
( )( ) (5)
o
t t t
t t t t o
t t t
E PE E
R P
λβ λ
+ +
+
 
Λ = =  
 
1 1 1( )
o o
t t tI Kφ + + +≡Φ ,  1 1 1' '( )o ot t tI Kφ + + +≡Φ , , 1t t+Λ  is the stochastic discount factor, otλ is 
the Lagrange multiplier,  and tQ  is the (real) shadow value of capital (Tobin’s Q ). Here, 
the elasticity of investment-capital ratio with respect to Q  is given by (1 ( "( ) ))δ δ η− Φ = . 
 
2.1.2. Financially excluded household utility maximization 
Financially excluded households are unable to smooth consumption in the face of 
fluctuations in their labor income. Thus, at each period they solve a static problem and 
therefore maximize their period utility, given by: 
1
1
1log( ) ( ) ,
1
m m m m
t t t tU C hC N
φ
φ
+
−
 
= − − + 
 
subject to  the following budget constraint: 
(1 ) (1 )
m
c m n t t
t t t
t
W NC
P
ι ι+ = −  
The first order conditions for the financially excluded households yield: 
1
1 (6)
(1 )( )
m
t c m m
t t tC hC
λ
τ
−
=
+ −
 
( )(1 ) 7
(1 )
n m
m t t t
t c
t t
W NC
P
τ
τ
−
=
+
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2.2. Aggregation 
Aggregate consumption and hours worked are given as a weighted average of the 
corresponding variables for each type of households, as follows: 
( )(1 ) 8m ot t tC C Cλ λ= + −
( )(1 ) 9m ot t tN N Nλ λ= + −
Also, aggregate capital stock, investment, bonds, and dividends are given respectively as
(1 ) ot tK Kλ= − , (1 ) ot tI Iλ= − , (1 ) ot tB Bλ= − , and  (1 ) ot tD Dλ= − . 
 
 
2.3. Firms 
Firms are divided into two groups of producers: final goods producer firms and 
intermediate goods producer firms. The goods from the intermediate firms are used as 
inputs by the perfectly competitive final goods producers firms. 
 
2.3.1. Final goods producer firms 
Final goods producer firms produce a final good tY and sell it in a perfectly 
competitive market. The final good is a composite of a continuum of differentiated 
intermediate goods ( )tX j , [0,1]j ∈  with a constant returns technology given by: 
1 11
0
( )t tY X j dj
ε
ε ε
ε
−
− 
=     
where ( )tX j  denotes the quantity of the intermediate good j , and 1ε > represents the 
elasticity of substitution between differentiated intermediate goods. The final goods 
producer firms choose the optimal amount of each intermediate good to maximize their 
profit, which is the difference between revenues and costs, taken as given price of the 
final good tP  given by: 
1
0
( ) ( )t t t t tPY P j X j dj∏ = −   
where ( )tP j is the price of 
thj  intermediate good. The solution of the firm’s profit 
maximization yields the set of demand function: 
( )( ) tt t
t
P jX j Y
P
ε− 
=     
and a zero-profit condition expressed as: 
( ) 11 110 ( )t tP P j dj εε −−=   
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2.3.2. Intermediate goods producer firms 
All intermediate goods producer firms use the same production function. The 
production function for producing an intermediate good j  is given by: 
1( ) ( ) ( ( )) (10)t t t tY j K j AN j
α α−
=
where tA  is  labor-augmenting technology shock, ( )tK j and ( )tN j  respectively represent 
capital and labor services hired by firm j , and 0 1α≤ ≤  is the share of capital to output. 
The technology shock is assumed to follow an AR (1) process with an i.i.d normal error 
term given by 1
a
t a t ta a uρ −= + . Firm’s cost minimization problem implies an optimality 
condition written as: 
( ) (11)
( ) 1
t t
k
t t
K j W
N j R
α
α
  
=   
−   
Thus, real marginal cost, which is common to all firms, can be written as: 
( )
1
1 12
k
t t
t
t t t
R WMC
P PA
α α−   
=    Θ   
where 1(1 ) α αα α−Θ= −  
 
2.4. Price Setting 
In each period, the intermediate goods producer firms in the economy set nominal 
prices according to a stochastic time dependent rule proposed by Calvo (1983). A fraction 
of the firms are able to set a new price *tP with probability 1 θ−  in each period. Thus, only 
a fraction 1 θ−  of the firms are able to reset their prices while the prices of the remaining 
fraction θ  are unchanged. The maximization problem of a thj  firm is given by: 
{ }* *,
0
max ( )
t
k p
t t t k t t t k t k t k
P k
E Y j P P MCθ ε
∞
+ + + +
=
 Λ −  , 
subject to: 
*
( ) ( ) tt k t k t k
t k
PY j X j Y
P
ε−
+ + +
+
 
= =     
The first order condition for the firm’s problem can be written as: 
( )*,
0
( ) 0 13
1
k p
t t t k t k t t k t k t k
k
E Y j P P MCεθ ε
ε
∞
+ + + + +
=
  Λ − =  
−  
where pt kε + is price mark-up shock common to all firms;  it is assumed to follow an AR 
(1) process with an i.i.d normal error term given by 1
p p p
t p t tuε ρ ε −= + . Finally, aggregate 
price level equation is described by: 
1
1 * 1 1
1 (1 )( ) (14)t t tP P P
ε ε εθ θ− − −
−
 = + − 
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2.5. Labor Market 
For wage dynamics in the economy, we consider two labor markets: a perfectly 
competitive and a monopolistically competitive labor markets. Under both markets, there 
is no difference between the wages among the households11. 
 
2.5.1. Perfectly competitive market 
Each household chooses the number of hours worked, taken as given the market 
wage rate. Thus, the real wage is equated to the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and hours worked. From the households’ utility maximization problem the 
wage setting for financially included and excluded households can, respectively, be 
written as:  
1( ) ( )(1 ) (15 )
(1 )
o o o c
t t t t t
n
t t
W N C hC a
P
φ τ
τ
−
− +
=
−
1( ) ( )(1 ) (16 )
(1 )
m m m c
t t t t t
n
t t
W N C hC a
P
φ τ
τ
−
− +
=
−
 
2.5.2. Monopolistically competitive market 
The wage setting under this market directly follows the one in Junior (2016). 
Households supply a differentiated labor services, ( ,t jN ), in a monopolistically 
competitive market structure, and these labor services are sold to a representative firm. 
The representative firm then aggregates these different types of labor service into a single 
type of labor input, tN , given by:  
1 11
,0
w
w w
w
t j tN N dj
ε
ε ε
ε
−
− 
=      
where wε denotes the elasticity of substitution between different types of labor. The 
representative firm then chooses the optimal amount of each labor service to maximize 
its profit taken as given the wage rate, tW , written as: 
1
, ,0t t t j t j t
W N W N dj∏ = −   
where ,j tW  is the wage of 
thj  labor service and t∏  is the profit. The solution of the firm’s 
profit maximization yields the set of demand function: 
,
,
t
j t t
j t
WN N
W
ε 
=    
 
and aggregate wage level equation expressed as: 
( ) 11 11,0 wwt j tW W dj εε −−=   
                                                            
11 That is, both financially included and excluded households receive the same wage rates. 
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Additionally, in each period a fraction,1 θ− , of the households, chosen randomly 
and independently, optimally define their wage by choosing *,j tW . This fraction of the 
households know that by optimally choosing *,j tW  for period t , they face a probability of 
N
wθ which leads to those wages remaining the same for N  periods. On the other hand, the 
remaining fraction,θ , of the households follow a wage stickiness rule proposed by Calvo 
(1983), which maintains the same wage by equating  current period wage to the previous 
one ( , , 1j t j tW W −= ). Therefore, considering the taxes on their labor income, the 
maximization problem of household i can be expressed as:  
 
*
,
1
, *
, ,
0
( )
max ( ) (1 )
1j t
i
j t kk i i n
t w t k j t j t k t
W k
N
E W N
φ
βθ λ ιφ
+
∞
+
+ +
=
   − − − −  +    
subject to : 
,
,
i it
j t t
j t
WN N
W
ε 
=    
 
 
This can be written as: 
*
,
1
*
,* *
0 , ,
1max ( ) (1 )
1
w w
j t
k i i i nt k t k
t w t k t k j t t k t
W k j t j t
W WE N W N
W W
φε ε
βθ λ ιφ
+
∞
+ +
+ + +
=
           
− + −       +            
  
 
The first order condition of the above problem yields: 
( ),*,
0
( )
( ) 15
1 (1 )
i
j t kkw
j t t w i n
kw t k t
N
W E b
φ
ε βθ
ε λ ι
∞
+
= +
  
=   
− −    
 
Finally, the aggregate wage level equation is described by: 
1
1 1* 1
1 (1 )( ) (16 )w w wt w t w tW W W b
ε ε εθ θ− − −
−
 = + − 
 
2.6. The Central Bank (Monetary Policy) 
There is a monetary authority who controls monetary policy by setting the 
nominal interest rate tr according to a Taylor (1993) rule expressed as: 
( )
( )
1
1 1 exp( ) 17
ryr
rt t t t t
t
ss ssss ss ss
R R Y Y
Y YR R
π
ρφρ φ
ε
−
− −
         Π =         Π          
where, rρ denotes the degree of interest-rate smoothing, πφ and yφ are the weights the 
central bank places on inflation and output growth, respectively, and rtε represents a 
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monetary policy shock which is assumed to be exogenous with an i.i.d normal error term 
written as r rt tuε = .  
 
2.7. Fiscal Authority (Fiscal Policy) 
There is a fiscal authority (government) who collects taxes from households and 
issues debt to finance his spending. The government budget constraint is written as:  
1 (18)
n
ct t t t t
t t t
t t t t
B W N BC G
PR P P
ι
ι −+ + = +
 The government possesses one fiscal policy instrument on the expenditure side 
( tG ) and two fiscal policy instruments on the revenue side: 
c
tι and
n
t . These instruments 
follow the same fiscal policy rules as in Junior (2016) and Forni, et al. (2009). They are 
respectively written as: 
( )
(1 )
1 1
1 1
exp( ) 19
g g g
gt t t ss ss
t
ss ss t t ss
G G B Y P
G G Y P B
ρ φ γ
ε
−
− −
− −
   
=       
( )
(1 )
1 1
1 1
exp( ) 20
c c cc c
ct t t ss ss
tc c
ss ss t t ss
B Y P
Y P B
τ τ τρ φ γ
ττ τ ε
τ τ
−
− −
− −
   
=       
( )
(1 )
1 1
1 1
exp( ) 21
n n nn n
nt t t ss ss
tn n
ss ss t t ss
B Y P
Y P B
τ τ τρ φ γ
ττ τ ε
τ τ
−
− −
− −
   
=       
 Here, tG is government spending, tB  is government debt, 
g
tε , 
c
t
τε , and nt
τε are 
government spending shock, consumption tax shock, and labor income tax shock, 
respectively. All those shocks are assumed to be exogenous with an i.i.d normal error 
term. 
 
2.8. Equilibrium 
Goods market clearing condition requires aggregate output to be equal to 
aggregate demand (the sum of aggregate consumption, investment, government 
spending) expressed as: 
(22)t t t tY C I G= + +
 
 
 
 
2.9.  Log-linearized equilibrium conditions  
Here, the log-linearized versions of the equilibrium conditions and the first order 
conditions are presented. The first-order Taylor approximation around a zero-inflation 
steady state is used for some conditions whereas other conditions precisely hold. Note 
that lower case letters or variables with “ ^ ” represent log-deviation with respect to the 
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corresponding steady state values. The following log-linearized equations summarize the 
equilibrium dynamics of the model. 
 
2.9.1. Households 
The financially included households’ consumption optimality conditions with 
equations (2) and (5) combined yields: 
^ ^
1 1 1 1
1 1 1( ) ( ( )) ( ( ) ) (23)
1 1 1 1 1
c
o o o c css
t t t t t t t t tc
ss
h h hc c E c r E E
h h h h
ι
π ι ι
ι− + + +
 
− − 
= + − − + −  + + + + +   
^ ^
1
1 (24)
1 1 1
c
o c o oss
t t t tc
ss
h hc c
h h
ιλ ι
ι −
−
= − − +
+ + +
 The investment equation (equation 4) and it relationship with the equation which 
describes the dynamics of Tobin’s Q  (equation 3) can respectively be written as: 
(25)t t ti k qη− =
1 1 1[ ( )] [1 (1 )] ( ) ( ) (26)
k
t t t t t t t tq r E E r E qπ β δ β+ + += − − + − − +
 The log-linearized version of the capital accumulation equation (equation (1) can 
be written as: 
1 (1 ) (27)t t tk k iδ δ+ = − +
 The financially excluded households’ consumption optimality condition 
(equation 6 and 7) can respectively be written as: 
^ ^
1
1 (28)
1 1 1
c
m c m mss
t t t tc
ss
h hc c
h h
ιλ ι
ι −
−
= − − +
+ + +
^ ^
(29)
1 1
c n
m m c nss ss
t t t t tc n
ss ss
c w n ι ιι ι
ι ι
= + − −
+ −
 The log-linearization of aggregate variables (real consumption and labor hours) 
implies that: 
(1 ) (30)m ot t tc c cλ λ= + −
(1 ) (31)m ot t tn n nλ λ= + −
Here, it is assumed that the steady consumption and labor supply is the same for all 
households i.e. o mss ss ssC C C= = and
o m
ss ss ssN N N= = . 
 
2.9.2. Firms 
The familiar equation (New Keynesian Phillips Curve) describing the dynamics 
of price inflation as a function of the deviations of the average logarithm of mark-up from 
its steady state level can be obtained from equation 13 and 14 written as: 
^
1( ) ( ) (32)
p
t t t p t tE mcπ β π κ ε+= + +
where, (1 )(1 )p
βθ θ
κ
θ
− −
= , 1t t tp pπ −= −  is price inflation and tmc is real marginal cost 
and using equation 12, we obtain: 
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(33)t t t tmc w y n= − +
 Additionally, cost minimization implies that the ratio of inputs (capital to labor 
ratio) given by equation 11 can be written as: 
(34)kt t t tr w k n= − +
 Also, log-linearization of the production function (equation 10) yields: 
(1 )( ) (35)t t t ty k a nα α= + − +  
 
2.9.3. Labor Market 
The log-linearization of the wage equation under perfectly competitive market 
(equations 15a and 16a) gives: 
^ ^
1
1 (36 )
1 1 1 1
c n
o o o c nss ss
t t t t t tc n
ss ss
hw n c c a
h h
ι ιφ ι ι
ι ι−
= + − + +
− − + −
^ ^
1
1 (37 )
1 1 1 1
c n
m m m c nss ss
t t t t t tc n
ss ss
hw n c c a
h h
ι ιφ ι ι
ι ι−
= + − + +
− − + −
   
where nssι  and 
c
ssι are steady state labor income tax and consumption tax rates, respectively. 
Also, the optimality condition following the household’s wage setting problem 
under monopolistically competitive market structure (combining equations 15b and 16b) 
yields the familiar New Keynesian Phillips Curve for wage inflation for each type of 
households as given below: 
^ ^
1( ) [ ] (36 )1
n
w w o n oss
t t t w t t tn
ss
E n bιπ β π κ φ ι λ
ι+
= + + −
−
^ ^
1( ) [ ] (37 )1
n
w w m n mss
t t t w t t tn
ss
E n bιπ β π κ φ ι λ
ι+
= + + −
−
where, (1 )(1 )w ww
w
βθ θ
κ
θ
− −
= , 1
w
t t tw wπ −= − is wage inflation. 
 
2.9.4. Monetary Authority 
The log-linearization of the monetary policy rule (equation 17) gives: 
( )1 1(1 )[ ( )] 38rt r t r t y t t tr r y yπρ ρ φ π φ ε− −= + − + − +
 
2.9.5. Fiscal Authority 
The log-linearization of the government budget constraint (equations 18) leads to: 
^ ^
1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (39)
c c n nss ss ss ss
t t t t G t ss C t t ss t t t
ss ss ss
B B W Nb r b g c w n
Y Y Y
β π γ ι γ ι ι ι
−
− = − + − + − + +
 Also, log-linearization of the three fiscal policy rules, equations 19, 20, and 21, 
respectively gives: 
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1 1 1(1 ) ( ) (40)
g
t g t g g t t tg g b yρ ρ φ ε− − −= + − − +
^ ^
1 1 1(1 ) ( ) (41)
c c c
t c t c c t t tb y
ι
ι ι ιι ρ ι ρ φ ε− − −= + − − +
^ ^
1 1 1(1 ) ( ) (42)
n n n
t n t n n t t tb y
ι
ι ι ιι ρ ι ρ φ ε− − −= + − − +
 
2.9.6. Equilibrium 
Log-linearizing the market clearing condition (equation 22) yields: 
(43)t C t I t G ty c i gγ γ γ= + +
where ssC
ss
C
Y
γ = , ssI
ss
I
Y
γ = , ssG
ss
G
Y
γ = are the ratio of steady states of real consumption, 
investment, and government expenditure to output, respectively.  
 
2.1.1. Shock processes 
All shock processes in the set-up are given in a log-linearized form and are 
assumed to follow an AR (1) process (except for the four policy shocks which are 
assumed to be exogenous) with an i.i.d normal distribution error term and with zero mean 
and its own variance, 2eδ  (i.e. 2(0, )et eu N δ  , where e is the shock type) written below: 
Price mark-up shock: 
^ ^
1 (44)
p p p
t p t tuε ρ ε −= +
Productivity shock 
1 (45)
a
t a t ta a uρ −= +
Monetary policy shock 
(46)r rt tuε =  
Government spending shock  
(47)g gt tuε =  
Consumption tax shock  
(48)c ct tu
ι ιε =  
Labor income tax shock  
(49)n nt tu
ι ιε =
 
It, therefore, follows from the above that equations 23 to 43, and the shock 
processes (equations 44 to 49) summarize the equilibrium in the economy. We consider 
two models here: Model 1 is the case where we consider flexible wage dynamics, whereas 
Model 2 considers sticky wage dynamics.  
 
2.2. Steady states 
The main steady state equations as implied by the model are summarized below: 
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(1 )ss ss
p
ss
W N
Y u
α−
= , where, 
1
pu ε
ε
=
−
, 
(1 )
( )
ss
C G p
ss
C
Y u
δαγ γ
ρ δ= = − − + , where, 
1 1ρ β= −  
1ssI G C
ss
I
Y
γ γ γ= = − −  
1( )
1
c nss ss ss
G ss C ss
ss ss
B W N
Y Y
γ ι γ ι β= − − −  
 
3. Bayesian Estimation of the Model 
The Bayesian inference method combines information from observed data and 
initial beliefs (priors) regarding the model’s parameters to perform an estimation, 
resulting in a posterior distribution (estimates). That is, the posterior distribution of the 
parameters of the model (based on its log-linear state-space representation) are obtained 
by means of this method. Below, we briefly describe the procedure of this method, the 
data, the prior distribution used, and calibration. 
 
3.1. Bayesian Inference Method 
For a formal set up of the Bayesian method, let ( | )p θΜ Μ denote the prior 
distribution of the parameter vector θΜ  for some model. Let the likelihood function of 
the observed data conditional on the model and its parameters be represented by
( | , ) ( | , )T TL Y p Yθ θΜ ΜΜ ≡ Μ . Here, ( | , )Tp Y θΜ Μ is the density of the data, Y  are 
observations until period T , and ( )p • stands for probability density function (pdf),  e.g. 
gamma, beta, generalized beta, normal, inverse gamma, shifted gamma, and uniform 
function (Griffoli, 2013). Also, let the marginal density function of the data conditional 
on the model be written as: 
( | ) ( ; | ) ( | , ) ( | )T T Tp Y p Y d p Y p dθ θθ θ θ θ θΜ ΜΜ Μ Μ Μ ΜΜ = Μ = Μ Μ   
Then, using Bayes theorem, the posterior density ( | , )Tp YθΜ Μ  can be expressed as 
the product of the likelihood function and the prior density, written as: 
( | , ) ( | )( | , )
( | )
( | , ) ( | )( | , )
( | , ) ( | )
T
T
T
T
T
T
p Y pp Y
p Y
L Y pp Y
p Y p d
θ
θ θθ
θ θθ
θ θ θ
Μ
Μ Μ
Μ
Μ Μ
Μ
Μ Μ Μ
Μ ΜΜ =
Μ
Μ ΜΜ =
Μ Μ
 
From the above, the posterior kernel corresponds to the numerator of the posterior 
density, given as ( | , ) ( | , ) ( | )T TY L Y pκ θ θ θΜ Μ ΜΜ ≡ Μ Μ . Also, the posterior distribution 
of the parameter vectorθΜ  for model Μ is directly proportional to the posterior density. 
This can be written as: 
( | , ) ( | , ) ( | )T Tp Y L Y pθ θ θΜ Μ ΜΜ ∝ Μ Μ  
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The above distribution is characterized by: standard measures of central tendency, 
such as the mean, mode, or median; and measures of dispersion, such as the standard 
deviation, or some selected percentiles. When the model and data of observables are 
given; the likelihood function can be calculated using the Kalman filter or other particle 
filters for non-linear models. By relying on the Metropolis-Hastings (MH) algorithm, and 
this what we use in the paper, the parameter values are drawn and used to plot a histogram 
of the posterior distribution. 
 
3.2. Data 
Estimation of the parameters of the DSGE model presented above uses quarterly 
time series data spanning 1985Q1 to 2017Q4 on real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), real 
household consumption expenditure, Consumer Price Index (CPI), real government 
expenditure, and nominal interest rate (monetary policy rate/discount rate) for Ghana.  
 Following Smets and Wouters (2007), log first difference of real GDP, real 
consumption, real government expenditure, and CPI multiplied by 100 are taken to 
represent output growth, consumption growth, government expenditure growth and 
inflation, respectively. Thus, our observed variables include: output growth, consumption 
growth, government expenditure growth, inflation, and interest rate. It is to be noted that 
quarterly series for real GDP, real consumption, and real government expenditure were 
interpolated from their annual counterparts using CPI as an indicator variable.12  
All series are seasonally adjusted except nominal interest rate. Series on CPI and 
nominal interest rate were obtained from IMF’s International Financial Statistics database, 
whereas series on real GDP, real consumption, and real government expenditure were 
sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (2019).  
 
3.3. Calibration 
Three of the model’s parameters and three steady state variables were calibrated; 
the remaining parameters were estimated. We calibrated some parameters (because the 
data points were insufficient) and chose these three parameters (ε , η , and wε ). We found 
that estimating them together with the other parameters distorted the convergence 
diagnostics of the MH algorithm, so, we set 6ε = , 1η = , 4wε =  using the calibrated 
values from Furlanetto and Seneca (2012).  Also, Gγ , which is the steady ratio of real 
government expenditure to real GDP, was calibrated using our observed data and  was set 
at 0.14. Also, the steady state values for consumption tax rate ( cssι ) and labor income tax 
rate ( nssι ) were set at 0.14 and 0.25, respectively. 
 
3.4. Priors 
The third, fourth, and fifth columns of Table 1 give a synopsis of our assumptions 
on the prior distribution of 25 parameters. In choosing the priors, in some cases, we used 
the calibrated values of the parameters from Furlanetto and Seneca (2012) and Gali et al., 
(2007) as prior means with an assumed standard deviation, while in other cases we 
followed the standard literature. 
                                                            
12 This interpolation was performed following Chow and Lin (1971). 
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Particularly, the discount factor and the depreciation rate are assumed to follow a 
Beta distribution with means 0.99 and 0.025, and standard deviations 0.002 and 0.003, 
respectively. The parameters governing the share of financially excluded households and 
consumption habit also follow a Beta distribution with means 0.5 and 0.7, respectively 
and standard deviation of 0.025 for both. 
A Gamma distribution is assumed for the coefficient of Frisch labor elasticity, 
with a mean value of 0.5 and a standard deviation equal to 0.01. The parameters governing 
the share of capital to output and Calvo price and wage stickiness are all assumed to 
follow a Beta distribution and fluctuate around 0.33 and 0.75, respectively. The standard 
deviation for the share of capital to output is 0.015, while both Calvo price and wage 
stickiness have a standard deviation of 0.01. The standard errors of all the innovations are 
assumed to follow inverse gamma distribution with mean 0.1 and standard deviation 10. 
Further, a Beta distribution is assumed for the price mark-up shock process with mean 
0.5 and standard deviation 0.1, and that of the technology shock having a mean of 0.95 
and a standard deviation value of 0.002. 
Moreover, as in Iwata (2009), the degree of government spending, consumption 
tax, and labor income tax smoothing parameters all follow Beta distribution with mean 
0.5 and standard deviation 0.075. Also, the parameter weight of government spending, 
consumption tax, and labor income tax on debt-to-output ratio are assumed to follow a 
normal distribution with mean 0.1 and standard deviation 0.05.  
Finally, the degree of interest-rate smoothing parameter is assumed to follow a 
Beta distribution with mean 0.69 and standard deviation 0.1. As in Smets and Wouters 
(2003), the parameters governing the weight placed by the central bank on inflation and 
output growth are both normally distributed with means 1.7 and 0.26, and standard 
deviations 0.25 and 0.015, respectively. 
 
4. Results and Discussion  
The results of the posterior estimation of the model’s parameters and the six 
exogenous shocks are reported in Table 1 for Model 1 (flexible wage dynamics) and 
Model 2 (sticky wage dynamics). Given our priors, we estimate the posterior distributions 
of the parameters using the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm. We run two independent 
Markov chains with five hundred thousand (500,000) draws and perform Brooks and 
Gelman (1998) convergence diagnostics. These results together with the trace plots 
suggest that the two chains have converged for both the univariate and multivariate 
convergence. Appendix A displays the trace plots of some selected parameters. We report 
the Bayesian posterior mean estimates of the parameters in the sixth and seventh columns 
of Table 1 for models 1 and 2, respectively. It can be seen that the posterior estimates of 
some of the parameters are close to the prior means (similar for both models), indicating 
consistency between the priors (our initial guess) and the information contained in the 
data. However, other parameters saw the posterior estimates moving far from their prior 
means indicating an additional gain from employing the data in our Bayesian technique. 
Below, we discuss the estimates of some selected parameters for models 1 and 2. 
 
4.1. Posterior Estimates 
The estimates of the fraction of the financially excluded household’s parameter is 
found to be 35% in model 1 and 52% in model 2. The parameter governing habit 
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persistence formation is estimated to be around 0.81 and 0.83 for models 1 and 2, 
respectively. Further, the estimate of the contribution of capital to output is modest, 
approximately 0.29 and 0.32 for models 1 and 2, respectively. The degree of price and 
wage stickiness are also found to be modest (0.75). Also, the inverse of the Frisch labor 
elasticity parameter estimate is found to be similar (about 0.47 and 0.50) in the two 
models. 
Concerning the monetary policy rule, the parameter representing the degree of 
interest-rate smoothing ( rρ ) had estimated values of 0.68 and 0.72. Also, the response of 
interest rate to inflation is closer to unity in the long-term in both models. We find that 
the Central Bank of Ghana (BOG) pursues strict anti-inflationary policies with an 
inflation coefficient ( πφ ) value of about 3.2 for both models. That is, for every one 
percentage point increase in inflation, BOG responds by raising the nominal interest rate 
by about 0.96 percentage points13. This finding is not surprising as BOG operates under 
inflation targeting monetary policy. Also, the parameter governing the weight BOG 
places on output growth ( yφ ) is estimated to be around 0.26. This suggests that for every 
one percentage point increase in output growth, BOG increases the nominal interest rate 
by approximately 0.078 percentage points. This finding suggests that BOG has been 
somewhat been modest in achieving greater output growth in the Ghanaian economy. 
 In addition, the estimated values of the parameters characterizing all three fiscal 
policy rules indicate that the fiscal authorities react modestly to debt-to-output ratio. 
Specifically, the parameter characterizing the response of government spending to debt-
to-output ratio ( gφ ) had estimated values of 0.039 and 0.173, respectively for models 1 
and 2. Using the estimates from model 2, it can be seen that a one percentage point 
increase in debt-to-output ratio induces an increase of about 0.02 percentage points in 
government spending. That is, as output decreases or debt increases the fiscal authorities 
adjust their budget accordingly to increase their expenditure. 
Finally, the parameter governing the response of consumption tax to debt-to-
output ratio ( cιφ ) registered estimated values of 0.24 and 0.14, respectively for models 
1 and 2. Thus, from the estimation results in model 2, for every one percentage point 
increase in debt-to-output ratio, consumption tax rate increases by about 0.018 percentage 
points14. Similarly, the parameter governing the response of labor income tax to debt-to-
output ratio ( nισ ) registered an estimated value of about 0.1. This suggests that a one 
percentage point increase in debt-to-output induces about 0.05 percentage points increase 
in labor income tax rate. These results suggest that the government finances its debt-to-
output ratio through an increase in consumption and labor income tax rates. Overall, the 
response of income tax rate to debt-to-output ratio is found to be the largest among those 
of the three fiscal policy instruments considered in the model. 
 
 
 
                                                            
13 Note that the coefficient of the inflation in the Taylor rule is multiplied by (1- rρ ) as shown in equation 
38. 
14 Note that the coefficients of debt-to-output ratio in the fiscal policy rules is multiplied by  one minus the 
smoothing parameters as shown in equations 40 to 42. 
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Table 1: Bayesian Estimation results 
  Prior Posterior 
Parameters  Distribution Mean S. D. Mean 
     Model 1 Model 2 
Households  
Financially excluded  λ  Beta 0.5 0.025 0.350 0.521 
Consumption habit h  Beta 0.7 0.025 0.8112 0.830 
Discount factor β Beta 0.99 0.002 0.994 0.994 
Depreciation rate δ  Beta 0.025 0.003 0.012 0.012 
Firms  
Share of capital α Beta 0.33 0.015 0.286 0.323 
Degree price stickiness θ  Beta 0.75 0.01 0.750 0.750 
Frisch labor elasticity φ  Gamma 0.5     0.01 0.473 0.504 
Degree wage stickiness wθ  Beta 0.75 0.01 - 0.750 
Monetary Policy (Taylor Rule)  
Interest-rate smoothing rρ  Beta 0.69 0.1 0.658 0.715 
Inflation 
πφ  Normal 1.7 0.25 3.261 3.263 
Output growth yφ  Normal 0.26 0.015 0.255 0.258 
Fiscal Policy  Rules   
Gov. spend. smoothing gρ  Beta 0.5 0.075 0.878 0.881 
Cons. tax smoothing cιρ  Beta 0.5 0.075 0.850 0.865 
Inc. tax smoothing nιρ  Beta 0.5 0.075 0.488 0.486 
Gov. spending debt gφ  Normal 0.1 0.05 0.039 0.173 
Consumption tax debt  cιφ  Normal 0.1 0.05 0.235 0.135 
Labor income tax debt nιφ  Normal 0.1 0.05 0.103 0.096 
Shocks  
  Persistence   
Technology aρ  Beta 0.95 0.002 0.956 0.955 
Price mark-up pρ  Beta 0.5 0.1 0.537 0.780 
  St. Dev of shocks   
Technology aσ  inv_gamma 0.1 10 23.147 51.259 
Price mark-up pσ  inv_gamma 0.1 10 54.942 99.170 
Monetary policy mσ  inv_gamma 0.1 10 4.483 3.809 
Government spending gσ  inv_gamma 0.1 10 7.057 7.680 
Consumption tax cισ  inv_gamma 0.1 10 114.62 68.820 
Labor income tax nισ  inv_gamma 0.1 10 0.086 0.094 
Log data density      -2047.4 -2021.3 
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4.2. Bayesian impulse response analysis 
In this section, we examine the impact of government spending, consumption tax, 
labor income tax, and monetary policy shocks on key macroeconomic variables. We also 
examine how each of the fiscal shocks affect the consumption and working hours by 
financially included and excluded households. Finally, monetary policy response to an 
expansionary fiscal policy is also analyzed. It is to be noted that all dynamic responses of 
the variables depict a one standard deviation shock to all innovations and percentage-
point deviations from their steady state. The blue lines represent mean impulse responses, 
while the gray areas indicate the 90% posterior probability band. Also, note that we 
discuss the results from our two models for government spending and monetary policy 
shocks. However, for the remaining shocks, we only discuss the results from model 2, 
using the log data densities of both models as the criteria, but report that from model 1 in 
Appendix B. 
4.2.1. Government spending shock 
The impulse response functions of key macroeconomic variables to a positive 
government spending shock are displayed in figures 1 and 2 for models 1 and 2, 
respectively. In figure 1, it is observed that an exogenous increase in government 
spending immediately leads to an increase in output, consumption (crowd-in 
consumption), and employment, and hence, aggregate demand increases. The fiscal 
authorities finance the increase in government spending through borrowing, as one of the 
means, and as a result public debt immediately balloons. The increase in aggregate 
demand exerts upward pressure on the prices of inputs, and goods and services. Thus, 
inflation increases by approximately 0.16 percentage points. However, because nominal 
wage setting is flexible, the wage rate immediately adjusts upwards by about 0.6 
percentage point following the rise in demand for labor. As a result, although inflation 
increases, real wage increases on impact (about 0.6 percentage points increase). Even 
though the increase in real wage is counterfactual, the increase in not substantial. The 
increase in real wage and employment raise the (real) disposable income of both 
households. 
It can also be seen that although aggregate consumption increases, the 
consumption of financially included households drops by about 0.19 percentage points at 
maximum but that of financially excluded households increases by about 0.88 percentage 
points. This is because monetary authorities respond actively to rises in inflation caused 
by increased in government spending through an increase in the nominal interest rate (by 
about 0.27 percentage points). Thus, financially included households take advantage of 
the rise in interest rate to save and to accumulate more capital and, therefore, reduce their 
consumption or substitute saving for consumption. This explanation supplements what 
has been documented in the literature. It is argued that financially included households 
anticipate government spending increase, financed by increased taxes and, therefore, 
reduce their consumption and rather increase their working hours. On the other hand, 
finically excluded households simply spend all of the increase in their (real) disposable 
income as they lack access to the financial market, which prevents them from saving to 
accumulate wealth.  
Moreover, from figure 2, the analysis and the transmission mechanism following 
expansionary fiscal policy are similar to the ones described above for model 1. However, 
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several differences between the two results should be pointed out. In particular, 
exogenous increase in government spending leads to increase in output, inflation, and 
employment but crowds-out consumption in the second model. Also, because nominal 
wage setting is sticky, the rise in inflation outweighs the slow increase in nominal wage. 
As a result, real wage decreases by about 0.05 percentage points on impact. As before, 
BOG through the Taylor rule moderates the inflationary pressures by increasing the 
nominal interest rate. The combined effect of these (a rise in nominal interest rate and a 
fall in real wage) led to a fall in aggregate consumption. However, although aggregate 
consumption falls, the consumption of financially excluded household increases by about 
0.054 percentage points, whereas that of financially included households decreases by 
0.18 percentage points on impact. Surprisingly, the estimated share of financially 
excluded households increased considerably, from 3.5% in model 1 to 5.2% in model 2; 
therefore, one would expect that the weighted average of consumption of the two 
households would have generated a rise in aggregated consumption in the second model. 
However, the opposite is found. Arguably, this negative consumption multiplier of 
government spending shock could be explained by two factors: [1] the active response of 
BOG to the rise in inflation through an increase in the nominal interest rate, and [2] the 
sticky wage dynamics that induces a fall in real wage and (real) disposable income. 
 By comparing the consumption of financially included and excluded households 
across the two models, the rise in consumption of the later is larger under flexible wage 
dynamics than under sticky wage dynamics. Specifically, expansionary fiscal policy 
(increased government spending) increased the consumption of financially excluded 
households by about 0.9 percentage points and 0.05 percentage points, respectively, under 
flexible and sticky wage dynamics. However, the fall in the consumption of financially 
included household is approximately the same on impact across the two models. On the 
effect of government spending on output and inflation, a slightly larger increase in both 
variables is found under flexible wage dynamics than under sticky wage dynamics. 
However, the output multiplier under both models are almost less than one. Thus, fiscal 
policy is more effective when the labor market is perfectly competitive and when wage 
setting is flexible.  
 
4.2.2. Monetary policy shock 
In this session, we analyze the effectiveness of monetary policy under both sticky 
wage and flexible wage settings. The responses of output, inflation, consumption, and 
employment to a positive monetary policy shock are displayed in Figure 3 for models 1 
and 2. It can be seen that, a contractionary monetary policy induces a fall in inflation, 
output, consumption, and employment. Although monetary policy is seen to be effective 
under both models, the magnitude and the impacts of the shock on the four 
macroeconomic variables are somewhat different. Evidently, the response of all the four 
variables to a rise in nominal interest are seen to be greater in a situation where wages are 
flexible than when wages are sticky. For example, whereas a contractionary monetary 
policy induces a fall in inflation and output by about 1.1 and 2.15 percentage points, 
respectively under flexible wage setting environment, it leads to a fall in the far variables 
by approximately 0.77 and 1.75 percentage points, respectively. Thus, it can be concluded 
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that monetary policy is more effective in an economy where wages are flexible than where 
wages are sticky. 
 
Figure 1: Response of macroeconomic variables to government spending shock (Model 
1: Flexible wage dynamics). 
 
 
Figure 2: Response of macroeconomic variables to government spending shock (Model 
2: Sticky wage dynamics) 
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4.2.3. Consumption tax shock 
The responses of the key macroeconomic variables to a positive consumption tax 
shock are shown in Figure 4. This shock has negative effects on the economy. The hike 
in consumption tax rate reduces aggregate consumption and output. Also, the reduction 
in aggregate demand exerts downward pressure on the prices of inputs and goods and 
services. Thus, inflation falls leading to an increase in real wage. The decrease in 
aggregate demand translates into a reduction in employment. As a result, aggregate 
employment immediately falls by about 1.15 percentage points and peaking at 3.02 
percentage points below its steady state value. It can be seen that the consumption of both 
households decreases on impact. To mitigate the damping effect on their consumption, 
financially excluded households increased their working hours by about 6.24 percentage 
points. That is, due to lack of access to the financial sector and savings, the only 
alternative is to increase their hours of work to increase disposable income. However, 
their included counterparts, having full access to financial sector, to some extent mitigate 
the fall in their consumption by tapping into their previous savings and rather decreased 
their hours of work by about 9.18 percentage points. Sadly, despite the increase in 
working hours of financially excluded households and the decrease in working hours of 
financially included ones, the former saw a larger reduction in their consumption than the 
latter. Specifically, the consumption of financially excluded households falls by nearly 
2.07 percentage points, continued to fall until the fifth quarter, peaking at 4.54 percentage 
points. However, the consumption of financially included households saw a fall of about 
0.76 percentage points, reaching a minimum of only 1.64 percentage points in the fifth 
quarter. These results suggest that financially excluded households are less resilient in 
terms of absorbing shocks than their included counterparts. 
 
4.2.4. Labor income tax shock 
Figure 5 presents the impulse responses of the select variables to a rise in labor 
income tax innovation. The rise in labor income tax discourages working and as a result 
aggregate employment decreased by about 0.003 percentage points on impact. 
Consequently, disposable income decreased, leading to a reduction in consumption and 
output. It can also be seen that the consumption of both financial included and excluded 
households was negatively affected. In particular, the fall in the disposable income 
induces a reduction in the consumption of finically excluded households by 
approximately 0.005 percentage points, whereas that of financially included ones was 
reduced by 0.0002 percentage points. Again, to insulate their consumption from the rise 
in labor income tax, financially excluded households had no option except to increase 
their working hours. That is, they increased their working hours by 0.024 percentage 
points. On the other hand, financially included households had their working hours 
reduced by approximately 0.033 percentage points. With access to the financial sector 
and availability of savings, they respond negatively to the rise in the labor income tax, 
but, still their consumption fell less than that of financially excluded households. In short, 
conditions grew worse for financially excluded households. 
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Figure 3: Response of output, inflation, consumption, and employment to monetary 
policy shock (the plots are the posterior means for models 1 and 2). 
 
Figure 4: Response of macroeconomic variables to consumption tax shock (Model 1) 
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Figure 5: Response of macroeconomic variables to labor income tax shock (Model 1) 
 
4.3. Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
In this section, we carry out variance decomposition analysis from the estimated 
model to examine the drivers of business cycle in the Ghanaian economy. In particular, 
we analyze the contribution of each of the shocks in the model to the variations in output, 
consumption, employment, and inflation. Table 2 reports the results at different horizons 
for those four variables. We follow Smet and Wouters (2003), and define 1-4 quarters 
(one year) as the short run, 10 quarters (2.5 years) as the medium run, and 100 quarters 
(25 years) as the long run. At a glance, it can been that whereas consumption tax shock 
appears to be an important driver of those four variables in the Ghanaian economy at all 
horizons, government spending and labor income tax shocks are less important in driving 
those variables. 
 In the very short term (one year), the key drivers of output is found to be price 
mark-up, technology, consumption, and monetary policy shocks. At that horizon, price 
mark-up shock was the main driver of output, contributing to about 45% variation in 
output, followed by technology shock (29%), consumption tax shock (19%), and 
monetary policy shock (5%). However, after the initial four quarters, technology shock 
overtook price mark-up shock to be the main driver of output in both medium and long 
terms. Specifically, it contributes to about 73% in the variability of output in the long-run, 
followed by consumption tax shock (18%), and price mark-up shock (8%).  
Turning to the drivers of consumption in the Ghanaian economy, it can be seen that, 
price mark-up shock, technology shock, consumption tax shock, and monetary policy 
shock are the most important. In terms of their contributions to the fluctuation in 
consumption, price mark-up contributes largely (about 52%) in the short run, followed 
by consumption tax shock (32%), technology shock (10%), and monetary policy shock 
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(6%).  The medium and long runs, however, had technology and consumption tax shocks 
dominating in driving consumption in the economy. 
With regard to the determinants of employment, price mark-up, technology, and 
consumption tax shocks are found to be the main drivers at all the horizons. In particular, 
on average, price mark-up shock is seen to be the main and most important driver of 
employment among the four shocks, accounting for about 58%, 37%, and 24% in the 
short, medium, and long terms, respectively. Also, technology and consumption tax 
shocks moderately drive employment at all horizons in the Ghanaian economy. 
Finally, similar results are found regarding the determinants of inflation. That is, 
price mark-up, technology, consumption tax, and monetary policy shocks are found to be 
main contributors to the fluctuation in inflation at all the horizons. In terms of their 
quantitative importance, price mark-up shock dominates, accounting for 59% in the long-
run, followed by technology shock (31%), with consumption tax and monetary policy 
shocks moderately influencing inflation in the long-run. 
 
Table 2: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (in percent) 
Shocks Output Consumption Employment  Inflation 
Forecast horizon: 1st  Quarter
Technology 29.39 10.15 24.98 23.39 
Price mark-up 44.63 51.63 57.54 67.63 
Monetary policy 5.43 6.47 7.61 2.78 
Government spending 1.22 0.05 0.65 0.06 
Consumption tax 19.33 31.69 9.21 6.14 
Labor income tax 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Forecast horizon: 4th Quarter 
Technology 46.38 35.97 9.07 30.20 
Price mark-up 26.71 29.21 58.08 59.88 
Monetary policy 1.46 1.63 3.97 3.63 
Government spending 0.40 0.01 0.34 0.08 
Consumption tax 25.05 33.18 28.54 6.21 
Labor income tax 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Forecast horizon: 10th Quarter 
Technology 64.39 58.53 25.74 30.53 
Price mark-up 11.96 0.57 36.90 59.49 
Monetary policy 0.58 12.40 2.17 3.59 
Government spending 0.21 0.00 0.20 0.08 
Consumption tax 22.87 28.50 34.98 6.31 
Labor income tax 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Forecast horizon: 100th Quarter
Technology 73.35 70.75 49.40 30.88 
Price mark-up 7.96 7.69 23.63 59.12 
Monetary policy 0.53 0.46 1.40 3.57 
Government spending 0.18 0.03 0.14 0.08 
Consumption tax 17.97 21.07 25.44 6.36 
Labor income tax 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
In this paper, we examine the impact of fiscal policy shocks on key 
macroeconomic variables in the Ghanaian economy, where a substantial portion of the 
population are financially excluded. Specifically, we analyze the effects of government 
spending, consumption tax, and labor income tax shocks on both aggregate and 
disaggregate consumption, on employment, and on other macroeconomic variables. To 
do that, we adopt a traditional New Keynesian DSGE model which features 
heterogeneous households: financially included and excluded households. We redesign 
the model by introducing two distortionary taxes, namely: consumption and labor income 
taxes. In addition, we consider two alternative labor markets: perfectly and 
monopolistically competitive labor markets. In short, we consider flexible wage and 
sticky wage dynamics in parallel. We then estimate the model’s parameters using 
Bayesian inference methods for the Ghanaian economy, using quarterly time series data 
from 1985Q1 to 2017Q4 on consumer price index, nominal interest rate, real household 
consumption expenditure, real GDP, and real government expenditure. We then analyze 
[1] the posterior mean estimates, [2] the Bayesian impulse response functions, and [3] the 
forecast error variance decomposition. 
To begin with, the estimate of the fraction of financially excluded households 
yielded slightly different values. That is, estimates of 35% and 52% were found under the 
two alternative models, respectively. Also, the parameter estimates in the Taylor rule 
suggest that BOG has responded more aggressively to inflation than output growth. 
Further, the estimates of the parameters governing the three fiscal policy rules indicate 
that the response of income tax rate, as a fiscal policy instrument, to debt-to-output ratio 
is the largest, followed by government spending and consumption tax rate. 
Moreover, the results from the Bayesian impulse response analysis show that t 
increased government spending has an expansionary effect on consumption, output, 
employment, and inflation, but turns to crowd-out consumption when wages are sticky. 
The output multipliers are found to be almost less than one under both flexible wage and 
sticky wage dynamics. At the aggregate level, the response of output and inflation to 
expansionary fiscal policy is somewhat stronger in a market where wages are perfectly 
competitively determined. Under both flexible and sticky wage dynamics, an increase in 
government spending has a decreasing effect on the consumption of households who 
enjoy full financial inclusion but has an expansionary effect on that of financially 
excluded ones. The excluded group is found to experience a decrease in their consumption 
due to an upward adjustment in the nominal interest rate by the monetary authorities 
aimed at moderating the inflationary pressures caused by that shock. Also, the sticky wage 
in the model induces a fall in real wage which also exerts a downwards pressure on their 
consumption.  
Furthermore, a hike in consumption and labor income taxes discourages working 
and, thus, leads to a decreased employment, output, and consumption. At the 
disaggregated level, the results signal that lack of access to the financial sector and 
savings leave financially excluded households with alternative to increase their working 
hours in order to mitigate the negative effect of those shocks on their consumption. On 
the contrary, households that are financially included use the financial sector mechanism 
for tapping into their savings to insulate themselves from those shocks and rather reduce 
their working hours. Sadly, despite those inter-temporal optimal decisions by both 
households, both shocks decrease the consumption of the former more than that of the 
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latter. That finding which supports the full financial inclusion agenda. Thus, we have 
empirically confirmed that when households are faced with shocks financially excluded 
households experience higher volatility in their consumption than financially included 
ones. Moreover, financially exclude households are less resilient in absorbing those 
shocks than their included counterparts. 
In addition, a contractionary monetary policy leads to a significantly fall in 
inflation and other real variables including output, employment, and consumption. The 
impulse analysis shows that the response of those variables to a positive monetary positive 
shock is stronger under flexible wage dynamics than under sticky wage dynamics. Thus, 
monetary policy is found to be more effective in achieving its targets when the labor when 
wages are flexible. 
Finally, the results of the variance decomposition analysis show that, from non-
policy shocks side, technology and price mark-up shocks are most important drivers of 
key macroeconomic variables including output, inflation, employment, and consumption 
in the Ghanaian economy. In terms of policy shocks, consumption tax shock emerges as 
the main driver of output, inflation, employment, and consumption in the economy with 
monetary policy shock playing a minor role. 
  From the policy perspective, government spending is effective in increasing the 
consumption of financially excluded households although it decreases that of financially 
included ones. Also, effective coordination between the fiscal and monetary authorities 
is necessary to help design an optimal policy mix that can foster growth and improve the 
livelihood of the citizenry. Again, the finding that productivity and price mark-up (costs-
push) shocks drive the key macroeconomic variables in the Ghanaian economy suggests 
that those shocks affect the transmission mechanisms of both fiscal and monetary policies. 
Thus, the government of Ghana needs to make frantic efforts to reduce the cost of 
production for firms and to also embark on technological research. For example, the 
Ghanaian economy has experienced electricity power outages over the past decade: one 
way to reduce the cost of production for firms is for the government to improve the 
electricity power supply to limit the power shortages, as power outages serve as a positive 
cost-push shock to the economy.  
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APPENDIXES 
  
Appendix A 
Trace Plots of some selected parameters 
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Appendix A continues 
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Appendix B 
Impulse responses functions from model 1. 
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Labor Income Tax Shock 
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